$NetBSD: patch-src_3rdparty_chromium_sandbox_policy_openbsd_sandbox__openbsd.h,v 1.2 2026/04/30 06:39:42 adam Exp $

* Part of patchset to build chromium on NetBSD
* Based on OpenBSD's chromium patches, and
  pkgsrc's qt5-qtwebengine patches

--- src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/policy/openbsd/sandbox_openbsd.h.orig	2024-12-21 10:25:10.571038055 +0000
+++ src/3rdparty/chromium/sandbox/policy/openbsd/sandbox_openbsd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+#ifndef SANDBOX_POLICY_LINUX_SANDBOX_OPENBSD_H_
+#define SANDBOX_POLICY_LINUX_SANDBOX_OPENBSD_H_
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/posix/global_descriptors.h"
+#include "sandbox/policy/export.h"
+#include "sandbox/policy/linux/sandbox_seccomp_bpf_linux.h"
+#include "sandbox/policy/mojom/sandbox.mojom.h"
+#include "base/sanitizer_buildflags.h"
+
+#if BUILDFLAG(USING_SANITIZER)
+#include <sanitizer/common_interface_defs.h>
+#endif
+
+namespace base {
+template <typename T>
+struct DefaultSingletonTraits;
+class Thread;
+}  // namespace base
+
+namespace sandbox {
+namespace syscall_broker {
+class BrokerProcess;
+}  // namespace syscall_broker
+}  // namespace sandbox
+
+namespace sandbox {
+namespace policy {
+
+// A singleton class to represent and change our sandboxing state for the
+// three main Linux sandboxes.
+// The sandboxing model allows using two layers of sandboxing. The first layer
+// can be implemented either with unprivileged namespaces or with the setuid
+// sandbox. This class provides a way to engage the namespace sandbox, but does
+// not deal with the legacy setuid sandbox directly.
+// The second layer is mainly based on seccomp-bpf and is engaged with
+// InitializeSandbox(). InitializeSandbox() is also responsible for "sealing"
+// the first layer of sandboxing. That is, InitializeSandbox must always be
+// called to have any meaningful sandboxing at all.
+class SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPORT SandboxLinux {
+ public:
+  // This is a list of sandbox IPC methods which the renderer may send to the
+  // sandbox host. See
+  // https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/linux_sandbox_ipc.md
+  // This isn't the full list, values < 32 are reserved for methods called from
+  // Skia, and values < 64 are reserved for libc_interceptor.cc.
+  enum LinuxSandboxIPCMethods {
+    DEPRECATED_METHOD_GET_FALLBACK_FONT_FOR_CHAR = 64,
+    DEPRECATED_METHOD_GET_CHILD_WITH_INODE,
+    DEPRECATED_METHOD_GET_STYLE_FOR_STRIKE,
+    METHOD_MAKE_SHARED_MEMORY_SEGMENT,
+    DEPRECATED_METHOD_MATCH_WITH_FALLBACK,
+  };
+
+  // These form a bitmask which describes the conditions of the Linux sandbox.
+  // Note: this doesn't strictly give you the current status, it states
+  // what will be enabled when the relevant processes are initialized.
+  enum Status {
+    // SUID sandbox active.
+    kSUID = 1 << 0,
+
+    // Sandbox is using a new PID namespace.
+    kPIDNS = 1 << 1,
+
+    // Sandbox is using a new network namespace.
+    kNetNS = 1 << 2,
+
+    // seccomp-bpf sandbox active.
+    kSeccompBPF = 1 << 3,
+
+    // The Yama LSM module is present and enforcing.
+    kYama = 1 << 4,
+
+    // seccomp-bpf sandbox is active and the kernel supports TSYNC.
+    kSeccompTSYNC = 1 << 5,
+
+    // User namespace sandbox active.
+    kUserNS = 1 << 6,
+
+    // A flag that denotes an invalid sandbox status.
+    kInvalid = 1 << 31,
+  };
+
+  // SandboxLinux Options are a superset of SandboxSecompBPF Options.
+  struct Options : public SandboxSeccompBPF::Options {
+    // When running with a zygote, the namespace sandbox will have already
+    // been engaged prior to initializing SandboxLinux itself, and need not
+    // be done so again. Set to true to indicate that there isn't a zygote
+    // for this process and the step is to be performed here explicitly.
+    bool engage_namespace_sandbox = false;
+
+    // Allow starting the sandbox with multiple threads already running. This
+    // will enable TSYNC for seccomp-BPF, which syncs the seccomp-BPF policy
+    // across all running threads.
+    bool allow_threads_during_sandbox_init = false;
+
+    // Enables the CHECK for open directories. The open directory check is only
+    // useful for the chroot jail (from the semantic layer of the sandbox), and
+    // can safely be disabled if we are only enabling the seccomp-BPF layer.
+    bool check_for_open_directories = true;
+  };
+
+  // Callers can provide this hook to run code right before the policy
+  // is passed to the BPF compiler and the sandbox is engaged. If
+  // pre_sandbox_hook() returns true, the sandbox will be engaged
+  // afterwards, otherwise the process is terminated.
+  using PreSandboxHook = base::OnceCallback<bool(Options)>;
+
+  // Get our singleton instance.
+  static SandboxLinux* GetInstance();
+
+  SandboxLinux(const SandboxLinux&) = delete;
+  SandboxLinux& operator=(const SandboxLinux&) = delete;
+
+  bool SetPledge(const char *pstring, const char *ppath);
+  bool SetUnveil(const std::string process_type, sandbox::mojom::Sandbox sandbox_type);
+
+  // Do some initialization that can only be done before any of the sandboxes
+  // are enabled. If using the setuid sandbox, this should be called manually
+  // before the setuid sandbox is engaged.
+  // Security: When this runs, it is imperative that either InitializeSandbox()
+  // runs as well or that all file descriptors returned in
+  // GetFileDescriptorsToClose() get closed.
+  // Otherwise file descriptors that bypass the security of the setuid sandbox
+  // would be kept open. One must be particularly careful if a process performs
+  // a fork().
+  void PreinitializeSandbox(sandbox::mojom::Sandbox sandbox_type);
+
+  // Check that the current process is the init process of a new PID
+  // namespace and then proceed to drop access to the file system by using
+  // a new unprivileged namespace. This is a layer-1 sandbox.
+  // In order for this sandbox to be effective, it must be "sealed" by calling
+  // InitializeSandbox().
+  void EngageNamespaceSandbox(bool from_zygote);
+
+  // Return a list of file descriptors to close if PreinitializeSandbox() ran
+  // but InitializeSandbox() won't. Avoid using.
+  // TODO(jln): get rid of this hack.
+  std::vector<int> GetFileDescriptorsToClose();
+
+  // Seal an eventual layer-1 sandbox and initialize the layer-2 sandbox with
+  // an adequate policy depending on the process type and command line
+  // arguments.
+  // Currently the layer-2 sandbox is composed of seccomp-bpf and address space
+  // limitations.
+  // This function should only be called without any thread running.
+  bool InitializeSandbox(sandbox::mojom::Sandbox sandbox_type,
+                         PreSandboxHook hook,
+                         const Options& options);
+
+  // Stop |thread| in a way that can be trusted by the sandbox.
+  void StopThread(base::Thread* thread);
+
+  // Returns the status of the renderer, worker and ppapi sandbox. Can only
+  // be queried after going through PreinitializeSandbox(). This is a bitmask
+  // and uses the constants defined in "enum Status" above. Since the
+  // status needs to be provided before the sandboxes are actually started,
+  // this returns what will actually happen once InitializeSandbox()
+  // is called from inside these processes.
+  int GetStatus();
+
+  // Returns true if the current process is single-threaded or if the number
+  // of threads cannot be determined.
+  bool IsSingleThreaded() const;
+
+  // Returns true if we started Seccomp BPF.
+  bool seccomp_bpf_started() const;
+
+  // Returns true if unveil(2) is used.
+  bool unveil_initialized() const;
+
+  // Check the policy and eventually start the seccomp-bpf sandbox. This should
+  // never be called with threads started. If we detect that threads have
+  // started we will crash.
+  bool StartSeccompBPF(sandbox::mojom::Sandbox sandbox_type,
+                       PreSandboxHook hook,
+                       const Options& options);
+
+  // Limit the address space of the current process (and its children) to make
+  // some vulnerabilities harder to exploit. Writes the errno due to setrlimit
+  // (including 0 if no error) into |error|.
+  bool LimitAddressSpace(int* error);
+
+  // Returns a file descriptor to proc. The file descriptor is no longer valid
+  // after the sandbox has been sealed.
+  int proc_fd() const {
+    DCHECK_NE(-1, proc_fd_);
+    return proc_fd_;
+  }
+
+#if BUILDFLAG(USING_SANITIZER)
+  __sanitizer_sandbox_arguments* sanitizer_args() const {
+    return sanitizer_args_.get();
+  };
+#endif
+
+  // A BrokerProcess is a helper that is started before the sandbox is engaged,
+  // typically from a pre-sandbox hook, that will serve requests to access
+  // files over an IPC channel. The client  of this runs from a SIGSYS handler
+  // triggered by the seccomp-bpf sandbox.
+  // |client_sandbox_policy| is the policy being run by the client, and is
+  // used to derive the equivalent broker-side policy.
+  // |broker_side_hook| is an alternate pre-sandbox hook to be run before the
+  // broker itself gets sandboxed, to which the broker side policy and
+  // |options| are passed.
+  // Crashes the process if the broker can not be started since continuation
+  // is impossible (and presumably unsafe).
+  // This should never be destroyed, as after the sandbox is started it is
+  // vital to the process.
+#if 0
+  void StartBrokerProcess(
+      const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerCommandSet& allowed_command_set,
+      std::vector<sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerFilePermission> permissions,
+      PreSandboxHook broker_side_hook,
+      const Options& options);
+
+  sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process() const {
+    return broker_process_;
+  }
+#endif
+
+ private:
+  friend struct base::DefaultSingletonTraits<SandboxLinux>;
+
+  SandboxLinux();
+  ~SandboxLinux();
+
+  // We must have been pre_initialized_ before using these.
+  bool seccomp_bpf_supported() const;
+  bool seccomp_bpf_with_tsync_supported() const;
+
+  // Returns true if it can be determined that the current process has open
+  // directories that are not managed by the SandboxLinux class. This would
+  // be a vulnerability as it would allow to bypass the setuid sandbox.
+  bool HasOpenDirectories() const;
+
+  // The last part of the initialization is to make sure any temporary "hole"
+  // in the sandbox is closed. For now, this consists of closing proc_fd_.
+  void SealSandbox();
+
+  // GetStatus() makes promises as to how the sandbox will behave. This
+  // checks that no promises have been broken.
+  void CheckForBrokenPromises(sandbox::mojom::Sandbox sandbox_type);
+
+  // Stop |thread| and make sure it does not appear in /proc/self/tasks/
+  // anymore.
+  void StopThreadAndEnsureNotCounted(base::Thread* thread) const;
+
+  // A file descriptor to /proc. It's dangerous to have it around as it could
+  // allow for sandbox bypasses. It needs to be closed before we consider
+  // ourselves sandboxed.
+  int proc_fd_;
+
+  bool seccomp_bpf_started_;
+  bool unveil_initialized_;
+  // The value returned by GetStatus(). Gets computed once and then cached.
+  int sandbox_status_flags_;
+  // Did PreinitializeSandbox() run?
+  bool pre_initialized_;
+  bool seccomp_bpf_supported_;             // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
+  bool seccomp_bpf_with_tsync_supported_;  // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
+  bool yama_is_enforcing_;                 // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
+  bool initialize_sandbox_ran_;            // InitializeSandbox() was called.
+#if BUILDFLAG(USING_SANITIZER)
+  std::unique_ptr<__sanitizer_sandbox_arguments> sanitizer_args_;
+#endif
+  sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process_;  // Leaked as global.
+};
+
+}  // namespace policy
+}  // namespace sandbox
+
+#endif  // SANDBOX_POLICY_LINUX_SANDBOX_OPENBSD_H_
